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Introduction 
 
 This research project explores the history of dengue fever in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, exploring how dengue was understood in a number of 
colonial societies across East and Southeast Asia. The RAC holds few files directly 
concerned with dengue fever, but as with other archives, much can be gleaned from 
reading the rich source material on disease, public health, and colonial governance 
‘against the grain.’1 The materials at the RAC – in particular those pertaining to the 
International Health Division (IHD)
2
 – provide a fresh perspective on dengue, 
infectious disease, and public health in Asia, and allow for a far more nuanced 
understanding of the medical environment. 
 As an ostensibly ‘background disease,’ dengue fever tends to attract less 
attention than various other infectious diseases, prompting the question of what 
variables and mechanisms determine a given disease’s ‘visibility.’ This question, 
central to my doctoral thesis, had thus far mostly been considered from medico-
scientific and governmental perspectives. The materials consulted at the RAC add to 
this body of sources, underscoring the role of philanthropy and private institutions in 
the shaping of health structures, the construction of disease ‘hierarchies,’ and the 
setting of priorities in clinical research. In this short paper, I consider the presence and 
absence of dengue in the documents of the Rockefeller Foundation, in part 
disentangling the disease from the sources that address an agglomeration of ‘tropical 
fevers’ and ‘malaria.’3 My geographical focus is on two regions in Asia where the 
IHD was particularly active: the Philippines (under US occupation) and the Dutch 
East Indies (most public health work there concentrating on the island of Java). 
 
Disease Visibility? 
 
In 1916, Dr. Samuel T. Darling submitted a report on ankylostomiasis, or hookworm, 
disease and malaria on the island Java in the Dutch East Indies to Dr. Wickliffe Rose 
and Dr. Victor Heiser, respectively the first Director of the IHD and Director of the 
East of the IHD. Exploring the possibilities for – and efficacy of – future public health 
programmes, Darling briefly surveyed the current organisation and activities of the 
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Geneeskundige Dienst of the Dutch colonial government. On the prevailing health 
priorities he reported: 
 
Very wisely the diseases regarded as of greatest importance, the spectacular 
ones, like cholera, small pox [sic] and plague receive much attention. 
…Diseases that are not so spectacular such as malaria and ankylostomiasis 
received little attention.
4
 
 
Given the prevalence of malaria throughout the region, including the Dutch East 
Indies, and the high mortality rates that resulted from infection, Darling’s suggestion 
that the disease was ‘not so spectacular’ is perplexing, as is his association of malaria 
with hookworm disease, a widespread and debilitating disease, but one far removed 
from malaria in terms of mortality. Despite its endemic presence, Dutch officials did 
not prioritise malaria but rather they concentrated on the prevention and management 
of epidemic diseases such as bubonic plague, cholera, and other so-called 
‘spectacular’ diseases. But if the principal “tropical” fever malaria was not considered 
‘spectacular,’ where did that leave dengue fever – a disease itself utterly 
overshadowed by malaria? 
 Why do certain diseases attract more attention than others? Why, for example, 
is there widespread recognition of Ebola, HIV/AIDS, and malaria – while far fewer 
people are familiar with, say, river blindness or trypanosomiasis? Why are some 
diseases and not others the object of intense government intervention, eradication 
efforts, and worthy of generous amounts of research funding – if not dedicated 
scientific organisations? Why has a library’s worth of scholarship been produced on 
the histories of bubonic plague, cholera, measles, malaria, smallpox, and influenza, 
but conversely little on beriberi, Rift Valley fever, and pink eye? In other words: why 
are some diseases so much more visible than others? The relative obscurity of dengue 
fever in colonial and medical archives raises the question of what processes and 
mechanisms determine the visibility of a given disease. 
 Mortality, morbidity, symptomatology, socio-cultural associations, and a 
disease’s comparative endemicity may all function to make it more or less prominent 
on our collective radar. Conversely, however, they can also inhibit this visibility. Low 
mortality figures decrease a disease’s position in the hierarchy, whereas significant 
morbidity and associated economic loss might increase it. As the historian David 
Arnold recently suggested, bubonic plague in British India introduced in 1896 sparked 
‘panic’ and intrusive public health legislation throughout the subcontinent while its 
ultimate mortality was lower and drawn out over a longer period of time than that of 
the influenza pandemic of 1918/1919 which did not spark such a response. To borrow 
Myron Echenberg’s expression: why was influenza ‘the dog that didn’t bark’?5 
Dengue epidemics, in many localities, only became a concern when such significant 
portions of the population were affected that it hampered productivity and trade, or 
undermined military operations. Other conditions were freighted with specific cultural 
resonances – for example, leprosy and HIV/AIDS – prompting fears of moral 
degeneration (among other associations). Other diseases became an object of attention 
through the intervention of activists, lobbyists, and philanthropists.  
 The diseases that Darling considered not particularly spectacular, interestingly, 
were central to the public health work of the IHD. Economic and sustainable health 
interventions were key to the health activities of the Foundation’s international 
programme. Through the demonstration of simple techniques of public health and 
personal hygiene – small interventions aimed at dispelling some of the most 
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widespread and endemic diseases – the IHD sought to contribute in a meaningful way 
to the health of populations overseas. 
In part through the Rockefeller Foundation’s activities, malaria had become an 
object of attention of the reformed Dienst Volksgezondheid of the Dutch East Indies – 
and in no small part through the work of the IHD’s representative, Dr. John Lee 
Hydrick, in the intervening years. His demonstrations resulted in the foundation of a 
Afdeeling Medische Propaganda and a youth organisation, the Gezondheids Brigades. 
In one of the pamphlets issued by this organisation, malaria was introduced to a 
young audience: 
 
We have all on occasion heard of Malaria, and we know more or less what is 
meant by it. Indeed, when one of our housemates or a servant has “fever,” we 
immediately say “Oh, he must have malaria” and we give him some quinine 
pills to take. However, not every fever is malaria. Still, malaria is a disease 
that is widespread, perhaps so widespread she might be considered a public 
disease. Perhaps even the most important public disease.
6
 
 
Everyone living in the tropical colonies of The Netherlands was probably familiar 
with this fever, and its prevalence throughout the Southeast Asian archipelago made 
it, perhaps, ‘the most important public disease.’ Nevertheless, the casual ‘Oh, he must 
have malaria’ did not suggest the disease was of particular urgency. Nor was malaria 
presented as particularly lethal; a few quinine pills would do the trick. Strikingly, only 
two sentences into the article, the author warned that ‘not every fever is malaria.’ 
Without further elaborating on this point, however, one is left to wonder what other 
“fevers” the author had in mind. Despite its prevalence, malaria was not alone – so 
what other conditions were overshadowed by this ‘most important’ malaria? What 
was left unsaid?  
It might be important to consider the question of whether malaria Anopheles-
control had a ‘spill-over’ effect on the dengue vector, Aedes. Traditionally occupying 
different environs, Rockefeller reports by Hydrick as well other files routinely 
discussed ‘mosquito control’ in the most generic sense: often without any reference to 
malaria at all. 
In the decades after World War II, the Rockefeller Foundation occasionally 
supported dengue fever research in various locales, including Indonesia. In a grant 
application of 1984 by David Morens, the history of dengue formed a brief part of the 
rationale for a clinical study. He stressed, 
 
In Indonesia, febrile illness reported to be dengue was described as early as 
1779. In modern times dengue has been documented in Indonesia since 1930 
when, in the course of dengue transmission experiments Snijders et al reported 
that on Sumatra dengue had been considered endemic for an indeterminate 
period of time.
7
 
  
This less than comprehensive account is in fact illustrative for brief histories of the 
disease in medico-scientific literature. The transmission experiments referred to, 
however, are an interesting addendum: the Dutch professor Emilius Paulus Snijders 
sought to transport dengue-infected mosquitoes to The Netherlands in order to 
conduct experiments on the disease and its transmission in a controlled, non-endemic, 
setting.  
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 The IHD was aware of these experiments, as becomes apparent in the 
correspondence between Dr. Wilbur Sawyer – the head of the IHD’s laboratory 
service and later director of the IHD
8
 – and Dr. W. Schueffner, who was attached to 
Snijder’s workgroup at the Colonial Institute in Amsterdam. In July 1933, the latter 
informed Sawyer apropos their research: 
 
‘First of all, the investigation in overlapping immunity between Dengue and 
yellow fever. Prof. Snyder [sic] had the opportunity to infect over sixty 
volunteers – students – with Dengue from Java and Sumatra. Twenty of them, 
some three till five times reinfected, (to strengthen the problematic immunity) 
from these reobtained the serum and could carry out the protection test with 
white mice. None of these sera showed any protective power, all the 
simultaneously vaccinated mice died!’9 
 
Schueffner’s report of the research being done – on yellow fever and dengue cross-
immunisation – was somewhat cryptic, but he concluded that the research suggested 
that no cross-immunisation between the two diseases occurred. The question of cross-
immunisation had been debated since the discovery that dengue and yellow fever 
were transmitted by the same mosquitoes. There was a pressing question of why 
yellow fever had not made its way into Asia, where the same vector was present but 
instead spread dengue fever. 
 Dengue was not a medical priority in the Dutch East Indies, but RAC 
materials indicate its presence there. Brief sketches and outlines, unexplored 
comparisons drawn between this and that disease, and incomplete research are the 
norm: dengue fever circulated and was not ignored, but simply neglected in favour of 
more pressing health concerns. Another region in Southeast Asia where the 
Rockefeller Foundation was active, and where dengue was considerably more of a 
priority, was the neighbouring Philippine Islands. 
 
Dengue in the Philippines 
In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the United States suddenly came to 
possess an Asian colony. American troops, arriving in 1898, gradually took 
possession of the formerly Spanish Philippines, losing a considerable number of 
soldiers to new and unfamiliar diseases along the way. Health, hygiene, and 
sanitation, were intrinsic to the ‘civilising mission’ Americans took upon themselves 
in their new colony – as has been explored in depth by the historian Warwick 
Anderson in Colonial Pathologies. Albeit one of the less lethal diseases encountered, 
US troops were encumbered by dengue fever – causing a ‘small constant non-
effective rate’ amongst the soldiers.10 In 1903, 171.4 cases per 1000 white soldiers 
were noted.
11
 While the incidence of various infectious disease was drastically 
lowered over subsequent decades, dengue fever remained particularly prevalent, 
consequently becoming a topic of interest to medical scientists in the region. 
 In 1906, the US Army Board for the Study of Tropical Diseases assigned two 
of its members, Percy Ashburn and Charles Craig (both military physicians), to study 
an epidemic of dengue fever that affected over 800 military personnel at Fort William 
McKinley, just outside Manila. The pair of scientists made considerable progress in 
confirming various suspicions about dengue, most notably its ‘ultramicroscopic’ 
(viral) and mosquito-borne nature. Despite Ashburn and Craig providing the rationale 
for effective dengue-control efforts through mosquito-control, the Philippine health 
authorities did little with this newly acquired knowledge, despite the acknowledgment 
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that is was rampant in Manila. In one of the few historical overviews of dengue, 
‘Dengue and US Military Operations from the Spanish-American War through 
Today’, the authors held that during ‘1902-1924, hospitalizations for dengue averaged 
101 per 1,000 persons per year (range 12-213/1000/year), and the average 
hospitalization lasted 7 days’, and approximately ‘40% of newly arrived troops 
acquired dengue within 1 year.’ 
 Notwithstanding its prevalence, dengue is only sporadically discussed in the 
files of the IHD. At the same time, the disease is not conspicuous in the papers of 
Victor Heiser, who was Director of Health in the Philippines between 1905 and 1915 
before becoming Director of the East for the IHD. By 1928, as dengue incidence 
showed no improvement since the beginning of American occupation, the Bureau of 
Science appointed three physicians, again attached to the military, James Simmons, 
Joe St. John, and Francois Reynolds, to conduct a study of the disease. By then, 
nearly 200 out of every 1000 white soldiers in the Philippines contracted dengue fever 
every year – yet the very opening sentence of their 1931 report made it clear that 
dengue remained of secondary importance: 
 
During the past thirty years the Medical Department of the United States 
Army has been actively interested not only in dengue but also in the similarly 
transmitted and more formidable disease, yellow fever. 
 
Both diseases came to the military’s attention with the acquisition of Cuba and the 
Philippines; yellow fever for its ‘appalling mortality’ and dengue fever for its 
‘extremely high morbidity rates.’ Later, the fact that both diseases were caused by the 
same vector also played a role: dengue’s prevalence in the Philippines augmented 
prevailing fears about the introduction of yellow fever in Asia following the opening 
of the Panama Canal – lingering suspicions that there might be some form of cross-
immunisation between the two diseases also concerned scientists.  
 Simmons, St. John, and Reynolds began their account of dengue’s aetiology in 
the Philippines: 
 
Although dengue has existed in the Philippine Islands for many years, there is 
no reliable information concerning the incidence of the disease or its spread 
among the native and white civilian inhabitants.
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For the military, however, detailed reports and statistics had been kept on the 
incidence of dengue, including its native personnel: 
 
Since the first American troops arrived in the Philippines, dengue, because of 
its high morbidity and the resultant loss of time from hospitalization, has been 
a source of considerable economic loss to the Army.
13
 
 
Economic loss, as I argue in my thesis, was a principal driver of dengue’s visibility, 
albeit usually temporary. The authors went on to assert that dengue incidence did not 
show any improvement, where other infectious diseases had been scaled back 
considerably over the last decades (see Figure 1). 
That tropical ‘fevers’ continued to be misdiagnosed and misunderstood – as in 
the Dutch East Indies – was emphasised as late as 1934 in a report to the IHD by Paul 
Russell ‘one of the division’s leading experts on malaria.’14 Russell recounted how 
‘[t]oward the end of 1933 reports began to drift in to my office that Davao was having 
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an epidemic of malaria.’ On closer examination of the blood smears of those affected, 
however, no malaria parasites were detected: 
 
There have been in Davao the past two months numerous cases of minor 
respiratory fevers, perhaps some dengue, a few digestive disturbances and 
possibly other conditions causing headache and a rise in temperature with 
concomitant joint and muscle pains and occasional chilly sensations. … It is 
barely possible that there has been an epidemic of an obscure 3-day fever, not 
dengue but of a similar nature. However, I believe it has most certainly not 
been malaria[.]
15
 
 
Figure 1: Dengue in American Soldiers, Philippine Islands, 1902 – 1928. 
 
 
 
Source: James Stevens Simmons, Joe H. St. John, and Francois H. K. Reynolds, Experimental Studies 
of Dengue (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1931), 6, Rockefeller Archive Center, RF, Nelson C. Davis 
Papers, S3.3, B23, F210. 
 
 
Russell concluded that malaria diagnoses had been made based on erroneous 
assumptions (specifically, deriving from blood platelet counts) by the local hospital 
technician. While he was unsure about what the epidemic had originally been, he felt 
it had not been dengue – although sporadic cases of that disease had also occurred in 
recent months. Echoing the Dutch warning that ‘not all fever is malaria,’ Russell’s 
report stressed the importance of proper diagnosis. 
 Little appears to have been done with the conclusions drawn by Simmons and 
his fellow researchers after 1931, and with the exception of scientific discourse 
dengue only occurs sporadically in the files held at the RAC. During World War II, 
however, dengue came back onto the radar of the military  – ranking as the second-
most important infectious disease in the Pacific theatre.
16
 Promoted to Brigadier-
General, Simmons advised a Senate sub-committee in 1944 on wartime health and 
education, as well as disease prevention and epidemic control research. Confidently, 
he asserted that ‘[d]engue and sandfly fever have been annoying in certain regions, 
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but both can be controlled with our new insecticides and repellents.’ Probably 
referring to recent successes with DDT in malaria control, Simmons maintained that 
‘great progress has been made since 1940 in our control of the insect-borne disease.’17 
 During the war, the Rockefeller Foundation supported research on dengue 
fever and other viral diseases. Serving in the US Army Medical Corps for the duration 
of the war, Dr. Albert Sabin – famous for developing an oral polio vaccine later on in 
his career – worked at the Rockefeller Institute at Princeton, together with other 
researchers such as Dr. Walter Schlesinger (who continued dengue research after the 
War). Their project focused on dengue fever and sandfly fever vaccine research.
18
  
For their Japanese opponents, too, dengue was an object of military interest, as 
outbreaks were common in Taiwan form 1895 when they gained control of the island. 
Later dengue was to hinder Japanese military operations in Southeast Asia during the 
Second World War. Wartime research on dengue was prolific on both sides, and there 
was direct competition between American and Japanese researchers. Dr. Susuma 
Hotta managed for the first time to isolate a strain of dengue virus in suckling mice 
(after such experiments had repeatedly failed in other laboratory animals). Americans 
were aware of Japanese advances in dengue research, as was evidenced by a 
‘confidential enemy translation’ of a research report by Captain Yutaka Nagaoka on 
preventive inoculation of dengue fever, which he based on observations and research 
of dengue in the Philippines over 1942.
19
 After the war, Sabin and his colleagues took 
over Japanese research, ferrying samples and papers across the Pacific, and ultimately 
collaborating with Japanese researchers.
20
 
 
Conclusion 
Victor Heiser, a prominent figure in the medical history of the Philippines, reflected 
in his autobiography on both government and Rockefeller attempts to improve the 
health of the archipelago. In his chapter ‘Washing up the Orient,’ he remarked how 
certain activities were steered by public perceptions of health problems and what 
constituted ‘dirt,’ rather than by informed medical opinion. In Manila: 
 
The citizens were being bitten continually by mosquitoes, and hence 
mosquitoes became, in their eyes, the paramount health problem. In reality the 
mosquitoes of Manila, though enormous in numbers, were negligible from a 
health point of view because they did not transmit any important disease there. 
 
Dengue fever, rampant in the capital as Heiser would have known, was, then, not ‘any 
important disease.’ Indeed, he continued to insist that time devoted to mosquito 
control was time ill spent: 
 
Water and soil pollution are the root causes of mortality in the tropics. We 
would have saved more lives in the end if we could have worked on these 
alone and disregarded the things which were merely irritations and not major 
public health hazards. 
 
His insistence that mosquito control did not greatly contribute to the health of the city 
is poignant. Reluctant attempts to control mosquitoes did little to curb the presence of 
dengue, but preventing the introduction of other mosquito-borne diseases should have 
been a concern to him in his function as Director of Health. First of all, there was the 
ever-present threat of malaria in the region, furthermore there was widespread 
concern among contemporaries that yellow fever might be introduced into Asia with 
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the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914.
21
 As such, it is noteworthy that Heiser 
attached such little value to mosquito control in Manila.  
 Dengue fever was, ostensibly, not on Heiser’s radar, nor did other health 
officials in the Philippines consider it a health priority during the early twentieth 
century. Likewise, in the Dutch East Indies dengue seldom made headlines. Dengue’s 
position, in the shadow of various other ‘tropical’ diseases, is not necessarily 
surprising, but it is striking how it was a disease that became particularly visible in 
military circles – most major research projects were conducted in the Philippines 
under the auspices of army medical officers. Meanwhile, in the Dutch East Indies, 
dengue’s potential to disrupt civil and military operations and economy had been 
noted as early as 1879, in a doctoral thesis by Gerrit Karssen – again, an ‘Officer of 
Health’ attached to the Dutch navy.22 
One important mechanism in ‘making dengue visible,’ which also shines 
through in the collections of the RAC then, was military disruption. IHD officers 
often collaborated closely with military health officials – as in both regions discussed 
here. As was noted by Gibbons et al., dengue would become ‘second only to malaria 
as a tropical disease of military importance,’ owing to how the disease ‘profoundly 
affected operations because of the weakness and fatigue that persisted for weeks after 
the acute phase.’23 The paradox at the RAC, as in medical and colonial collections 
elsewhere, is that the files available confirm that dengue was indeed a serious concern 
in the Philippines and the Southeast Asia region, while at the same time the disease 
remains obscure within these sources.  
The history of dengue fever sheds much light on the development of the 
discipline of tropical medicine, and provides crucial insights into the practice of 
Western medicine in colonial Asia. At the same time, the mechanisms which make 
this and other diseases ‘visible’ can be explored in greater depth, and at the same time 
the historical ‘construction’ or ‘framing’ of this still obscure disease – often as a 
painful but benign ‘fever’ – allows for an analysis of how disease identities have been 
constituted. The materials consulted at the Rockefeller Archive Center add 
considerably to all these themes discussed in my thesis Dengue Fever in Modern Asia, 
and I would like to express my sincere gratitude for the support I received from The 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Archive Center in making this research 
visit possible. 
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